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The West African Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak is the
largest ever seen, with over 28,000 cases and 11,300 deaths
since early 2014.1 The magnitude of the outbreak has
tested fragile governmental health systems and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to their limit. Spreadmunity, Inflammation and Physio
@ucl.ac.uk (F. Fitzgerald), wahe
.
.04.016
hed by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of T
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).from a rural outbreak source in the Gue´cke´dou district of
Guinea to the crowded urban environments of Monrovia,
Conakry and Freetown allowed viral transmission on an un-
precedented scale.2 Over a year after the EVD transmission
was established in Freetown, Sierra Leone, it is time to take
stock. At the peak of the outbreak, pragmatic decisions
were taken about how to respond to the novel situationlogical Medicine, UCL Institute of Child Health, University College
edscm@gmail.com (W. Awonuga), tejshrishah@gmail.com (T. Shah),
he British Infection Association. This is an open access article under
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Without understanding those decisions and the shape of
the response in Sierra Leone, it is difficult to interpret
data emerging from the outbreak.
Here we describe the setting of the outbreak and the
emergency response in the densely populated Western Area
of Sierra Leone including the capital Freetown, to demon-
strate features of the response which particularly impacted
on children. Issues affecting data collection will be
described, followed by an urgent call for granular and
contextual research into the current outbreak in order to
plan better for the future.
Ebola in the Western Area of Sierra Leone
The Western Area of Sierra Leone is the most densely
populated area of Sierra Leone, with w1 million inhabi-
tants at the last published census (2004), over 25% of whom
live in informal housing, and only 26% of whom have a
private toilet.3 In certain areas of Freetown, the popula-
tion density reaches 40,000 persons/km2.3 In 2013, Sierra
Leone had 0.2 doctors and 1.7 nurses/midwives per
10,000 population.4 For context, corresponding figures in
South Africa were 7.8 and 49, and 27.9 and 88.3 in the
United Kingdom.4 In this environment of overcrowding,
poor sanitation and an overstretched health system, trans-
mission of EVD was the most intense out of all areas
affected in this outbreak.5
Ebola virus is an enveloped filovirus thought to have a
natural host in bats.6 It has previously caused isolated out-
breaks in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo
with a mortality rate of up to 81%.7,8 Transmission is via
contact with bodily fluids particularly in later stages of
the disease, with corpses being highly contagious. The incu-
bation period is 2e21 days (mean 11.4).9 Pooled adult and
paediatric data as well as clinical experience suggest that
clinical manifestations of the disease in this outbreak differ
from previous ones. Along with fever and fatigue, gastroin-
testinal features are much more prominent, occurring in
50e68% of cases with diarrhoea being significantly associ-
ated with a fatal outcome.10e12 Gastrointestinal fluid loss
and resultant electrolyte imbalance can be dramatic with
up to 10 L of diarrhoea a day and resultant hyponatraemia
and hypokalaemia.13,14 Spontaneous bleeding is uncommon
in this outbreak, seen in 2e18% of patients.9,10,15 Overall,
the mortality rate for this outbreak is w56%.16
The Ebola holding unit model
One of the most insidious and destructive features of EVD is
its proclivity for infecting health care workers (HCWs). To
date, over 880 HCWs have been infected in this outbreak
with a mortality rate of 58%.1 Coupled with the non-
specificity of symptoms, this breeds distrust within hospi-
tals and other health care facilities whereby doctors and
nurses view their patients with fear and in turn patients
fear health facilities. Without a robust system for triaging
and testing potential EVD patients, hospitals closed as staff
were too afraid to come to work. Such a situation was seen
in the John F Kennedy hospital in Monrovia, Liberia in July
2014.17 The impact this closure had on nationwide mortalityrates from other conditions is not fully defined. In Sierra
Leone, inpatient admissions dropped by 70% from May to
October, leaving a predicted 35,000 patients without essen-
tial inpatient care,18 and additional deaths from malaria
alone exceeding those from EVD.19,20 A reduction in vaccine
coverage led to a prediction of 12,000 additional deaths
from measles.21 In order to avoid a catastrophic cessation
of any health care provision in the Western Area, a novel
Ebola Holding Unit (EHU) model was developed.22
In the EHU model, the most frequented health care
facilities e hospitals and community health centres e all
have an associated EHU on site for safe isolation and testing
of potential EVD patients. All those seeking health care are
screened at the gate using a questionnaire asking about
potential EVD contacts and symptoms (Fig. 1). Potential
Ebola suspect cases are also referred by district surveil-
lance officers (DSOs) in the community, or from observa-
tional interim care centres (OICCs). OICCs care for, and
observe, asymptomatic children who have had close con-
tact with an EVD patient and have no other caregiver for
the 21-day incubation period of EVD.
Those with a positive contact, or a fever and 3 or more
symptoms consistent with EVD (Fig. 1), are admitted as a
suspected case to the EHU for EVD testing (Fig. 2). A venous
blood sample is sent to specialist laboratories with category
4 facilities where a quantitative polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) for Ebola is performed. Depending on the test result,
patients are transferred on to an Ebola treatment centre
(ETC: these tended to be large specially built and designed
units set up and run by NGOs in response to the outbreak),
admitted to the general ward if still needing inpatient
treatment for a non-EVD condition, or discharged home if
recovered. In Freetown, patient movement was coordi-
nated by the Western Area emergency response centre
(WAERC), which was in daily contact with each EHU and
ETC, community DSOs and the laboratories processing sam-
ples for EVD testing.
The principal features of EHUs were that they were
rapidly built (with a lead time of as little as 48 h); co-
located at existing hospitals and functioned in partnership
between anNGOand the Sierra LeoneanMinistry of Health.22
Their primary functions were threefold: isolation of sus-
pected cases to minimize community transmission, mainte-
nance of non-EVD-related healthcare provision, and the
creation of an EVD-free environment within the adjoining
hospital through gate and ward daily screening combined
with immediate on site isolation for protection of healthcare
workers and other patients.23 In our experience, the provi-
sion of care across EHUs was heterogeneous, dependent on
staffing numbers, skillsets and the space available within
the facility. Care varied between a “no needle” policy with
provision of oral medications only, to more sophisticated
therapy with intraosseous infusions and blood transfusions.
At the peak of the Sierra Leone outbreak in late 2014,
there were bottlenecks at each stage of this system.
Patients could wait for 48 h to be admitted to an EHU, up
to 8 days in an EHU (the mean duration of admission in
late November 2014 was 2.3 days) waiting for test results
or bed availability in an ETC, and then face long transfer
distances to the nearest available ETC bed. During the
peak of the outbreak laboratories were not co-located at
EHUs and laboratory capacity did not meet demand, so the
Figure 1 Screening Flowchart for Ebola used on attendance at health care facilities in the Western Area of Sierra Leone.
From Clinical Management of patients in the Ebola treatment Centres and other Care Centres in Sierra Leone: A Pocket Guide.
Interim emergency guidelines. Sierra Leone adaptation. World Health Organization. December 2014.
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in the week ending 18th November 2014, EHU bed capacity
stood at 130, and the Western Area ETC bed capacity at
126, all of which were occupied (Fig. 3). 486 suspected
cases reported in the community were unattended for
>24 h as the EHUs were full. There were 158 new EVD
cases diagnosed of which 44 (28%) had to be transferred
at least 400 km to the nearest free ETC bed (WAERC
data, unpublished). By early February 2015, there were
619 Western Area ETC beds of which 32 were occupied
(5%). Ambulance availability varied between 4 and 30
per day for the whole Western Area, which also hindered
efficient patient flow.
These bottle necks did not only delay access to ETCs
which were often better staffed and better equipped tomanage EVD patients, but also increased the time during
which those who subsequently tested negative were
exposed to those who did have EVD. The risk of EHUs acting
as an amplification site for EVD has been raised, although
positive readmission rates at EHUs in Freetown of 1.5e3.3%
compare favourably to previously documented rates of 9%
in other regions.24,25 Notably all the readmitted patients
documented by Fitzpatrick et al.24 had exposure to EVD in
the community before their first admission.Holding units and children
The WHO case definition for suspected EVD in children is
even broader than for adults.26 Children under 5 years of
Figure 2 Flowchart of patients attending health care
facilities in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
*OICC: Observational Interim Care Centre.
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admitted to an EHU, meaning that large numbers of chil-
dren will be admitted to subsequently test negative.26
This proportion increased as EVD cases fell: in lateFigure 3 Graph of Western Area Bed Capacity and Demand at Ebo
7 day rolling averages as reported to the Western Area Ebola RespNovember 2014 13/39 (33%) of children admitted at the
main children’s hospital EHU tested positive, whereas in
late April 2015 73 children were admitted with none testing
positive (WAERC data, unpublished). There are currently no
data available on the impact of admission to an EHU for
children who subsequently test negative for EVD. Both the
potential risk of nosocomial EVD transmission and the
impact on mortality for common conditions such as malaria
or sepsis are currently unquantified.
Due to the perceived risk of EVD exposure, most EHUs
adopted a policy of forbidding asymptomatic mothers from
accompanying their unwell children into EHUs. This,
coupled with the fact that many children had already lost
family members to EVD, meant that approximately 40% of
children were admitted unaccompanied to EHUs (Fitzgerald
et al. under review). Our team found the provision of care
to unaccompanied children in a Red Zone (full barrier
nursing, where risk of Ebola exposure was judged to be
highest) environment extremely challenging.
The first challenge was the difficulty of personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE). The occlusive heat of PPE means
time in the Red Zone is limited, and must be divided
between duties such as cleaning, drug administration,
admitting and discharging patients as well as support for
activities of daily living. At the peak of the outbreak
estimates of time available for patient care and medical
decision-making varied between 3 and 20 min per pa-
tient.27,28 Attempting to give sufficient oral rehydration
solution (ORS) to a sick child alongside other medications
in this time frame is almost impossible. Furthermore, in
combination with a language barrier experienced by
most international workers, PPE hinders effectivela Holding Units and Ebola Treatment Centres. Trendlines are of
onse Command Centre.
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terrifying. Finally, PPE is flimsy: it will not withstand chil-
dren’s prying fingers, risking breaches and making close
interaction dangerous.
Secondly, ambulant unaccompanied children are diffi-
cult to control. The key to a safe EHU is isolation and
patient separation, a lonely child is liable to leave their bed
space to seek comfort from other patients in the unit,
increasing the risk of cross-contamination in the unit. Non-
ambulant children in cots would cry so piteously that other
patients with as yet unconfirmed EVD status would take
them out and comfort them, again increasing the risk of
EVD transmission.
Thirdly, Red Zones are full of risks beyond EVD exposure,
including sharps bins and buckets of strong chlorine solution
that children may mistake for a bath or attempt to drink,
both situations that have been experienced in both our
units and others in Freetown (pers. comm., T Helderman,
Medair). We have also had experience of children trying to
escape out of the Red Zone and back to their parents.
One unit did insist on children being accompanied by
caregivers despite the risk of EVD due to staffing con-
straints. The differential impact on outcome of being
admitted with a caregiver or not has not been investigated,
nor has the risk to caregivers been quantified.
Finally, there is the question of transfer distances. Even
the closest ETCs were 45e60 min drive from most of
Freetown’s EHUs, which many children would have to
undergo alone as minimal clinical care was provided in
the ambulances. For the longer transfer distances, mortal-
ity rates for adults and children of up to 60% in the
ambulance were reported back to our units.
Data availability
There are many pressing questions about whether poten-
tially modifiable factors such as caregiver accompaniment
and transfer distances, not to mention medical care given,
affected mortality in children admitted to EHUs. However
effective data collection is not straightforward. Linking
data from EHUs and ETCs is critical. Patients may have
spent several days in an EHU receiving care prior to
transfer. Without EHU data, results from an ETC alone will
be subject to a survivor bias that may result in dramatically
lower mortality rates than that seen elsewhere.10,28e31
Similarly, data from EHUs alone will be missing outcomes
for patients transferred out.15 Data from ETCs was not
routinely fed back to the WAERC, the national Ebola
response centre or to the centralized viral haemorrhagic fe-
ver (VHF) database curated by the CDC, meaning that larger
scale epidemiological studies are missing outcomes in up to
50% of confirmed EVD cases.11,32 This meant the live case
management team at the WAERC were unable to track pa-
tients through to their final outcomes in ETCs, and so could
not even inform relatives of a patient’s death or survival,
particularly if the patient had been transferred out of area.
Future research and recommendations
There is urgent need for a detailed investigation of the
trajectory of both adults and children admitted to EHUs. Itis crucial to investigate the impact of the EHU model on
those confirmed to have EVD and those who subsequently
test negative. The impacts on mortality from diseases other
than EVD in EHUs have so far only been modelled rather
than directly investigated. There are potentially modifiable
health system factors such as caregiver accompaniment or
transfer distances that could impact on mortality. Along-
side this, the risk for caregivers of nosocomial infection
must be quantified. Even if the risk of admission to an EHU
is deemed unacceptably high, an evidence base could be
used to lobby for employing EVD survivors (understood to be
at low risk of reinfection) to look after children admitted to
EHUs, as has happened in limited circumstances.33
The EHU model was set up as a pragmatic, rapid
response to a health care crisis when existing facilities
were overwhelmed. EHUs effectively protected hospitals
and their staff from EVD infection and isolated several
thousand EVD patients with minimal staff and re-
sources.15,22 Confines of space and resources necessitated
transferring out confirmed EVD patients to ETCs which
may have impacted on mortality due to the transfer itself.
In the future, a model whereby at the peak of an outbreak,
suspect patients are immediately transferred to dedicated
ETCs for both testing and treatment might mitigate both
the duration of time spent in a unit for those who test nega-
tive, and delays in instituting the more invasive and aggres-
sive care that tended to be available in better-resourced
ETCs. However this requires excellent channels of commu-
nication and ready availability of ambulances, alongside
ETC capacity, which were in scant supply in Freetown until
December 2014 (Fig. 3).
It is crucial that any model of care should be responsive
and as necessary adapted over the course of the outbreak.
Although rapid transfer with testing remote from general
healthcare facilities is appropriate at the peak of an
outbreak when prevalence of EVD in an EHU is high, this
is unfeasible at the end, when most are suffering from non-
EVD complaints. As discussed above, this is particularly true
for children given the breadth of the case definition.
Refinement and adaption of the case definition according
to emerging evidence and local disease prevalence should
be encouraged. For example, the stratification of the case
definition into high or low risk for EVD is an important
operational distinction that could facilitate rapid patient
referral to the most appropriate centre of care.
A transformative intervention would be a sensitive and
specific point of care (POC) EVD test that could avoid the
delays inherent in transporting blood samples to offsite
laboratories for testing. A POC test would negate the need
for lengthy admissions in EHUs and so minimize unnecessary
exposures to EVD for those testing negative. Several of
these tests are in development with promising results in
adults, although few data are available from children.34,35
Availability of effective vaccination would completely
alter the management of EVD outbreaks in the future, and
recent evidence looks promising.36,37 Both a recombinant
chimpanzee adenovirus vector (recombinant chimpanzee
adenovirus type 3-vectored Ebola Zaire vaccine (ChAd3-
EBO-Z)) and a recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus vector
(recombinant, replication-competent vesicular stomatitis
virus-based candidate vaccine expressing Zaire Ebolavirus
glycoprotein (rVSV-ZEBOV)) have reached Phase III trials36
Ebola response in Sierra Leone: The impact on children S11(ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier NCT02485301). In a cluster-
randomised ring vaccination trial in Guinea, rVSV-ZEBOV
was found to have 100% efficacy (95% CI 74.7e100) with a
75.1% effectiveness (95% CI 7.1e94.2) for all eligible adults
at the cluster level.36 However, it should be noted that there
are minimal safety or immunogenicity data in children: a
crucial knowledge gap that must be rapidly addressed.
Breakthrough EVD cases occurred in under eighteen year
olds (excluded from the trial) in both the immediate and de-
layed groups of the ring vaccination trial highlighting that
effective adult vaccination may not be sufficient to protect
unvaccinated children.36 Two trials in children are currently
planned but not yet recruiting (ClinicalTrials.gov Identifiers
NCT02548078 and NCT02509494).
Conclusions
The EHU model was a major contributor to the effective-
ness of the Ebola Response in Sierra Leone, isolating the
majority of suspect cases in the Western Area of Sierra
Leone.22 Questions remain regarding the impact of the
model on patients with and without EVD, and how the
response might be improved in future. These questions
will be unanswered without a rapid and focused effort to
collect data from EHUs, ETCs, staff members and relatives,
and to triangulate these with laboratory results, burial da-
tabases and child protection data. In the September 2015
reports from the Sierra Leonean national Ebola response
centre, there are still 1500 patients with confirmed EVD
with an unknown outcome. Our understanding of EVD out-
comes is poor, and risks remaining so without urgent colla-
tion and sharing of the data available. It is only with a more
comprehensive evidence base that we will be able to move
forward with successful implementation of interventions
such as vaccines or POC tests. At present, there is still no
consensus on critical questions such as the safety of care-
giver accompaniment of children in a Red Zone. Data
sharing between NGOs and government organisations will
be key to creating a safer and more effective Ebola
response in the future, both for children, adults and the
health care workers that staff them.
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